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Abstract:  In study of traditional economic management game, do not generally 
consider the interaction between the player's actions and environment. However, for 
some practical problems such as launch some projects with pollution in a certain area, 
one have to consider the relation between the player’s interests and the environment. 
In this paper, we introduce a so-called gross interest-environment game based on 
binary number and n-person non-cooperative game theory. It is studied that utility 
function of the game and conditions for Nash equilibria. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the traditional economic management game, one does not consider the interaction between the 
players’ interests and the environment. The literature [1] is an example with which system economists 
are very familiar. The model shows that if a resource has no exclusive ownership, the resource will be 
excessively used [2]. This model is of great significance in environmental management science as well. 
For example, if fishermen should have unlimited fishing in high seas, the fish would be extinct. On the 
earth if enterprises should emit unlimitedly pollutants, the mankind survival environment would be 
increasingly worse.  
The literatures [3,4] studied the so-called condition games. The literature [5] discussed applications 
of condition games to economic management science. The literatures [6,7] considered applications of 
them to environmental management science. These applications are be long to sustainable development 
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issues in environmental and economic management sciences.  
However there are other subjects as well. For example, we consider the case that some enterprises in 
a region want to start some projects with pollution. If these enterprises do not consider the interaction 
between their interest and the environment that enterprises damage to the environment and the 
environment affect interest of the enterprises and other objects that dependent on the environment, then 
the game is the traditional one. However, such environment interfere cannot be underestimated for the 
players' interests.  
Our task will be to consider the environmental issues, a new game system that is gross interest – 
environment games. In this paper, we shall first give the model of the games and then study the 
conditions for Nash equilibria in them.  
 
2.  GROSS INTEREST-ENVIRONMENT GAMES 
 
A system [ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡  is called an n-person finite non-cooperative game, 
where {1, 2, , }N n= L is the finite set of all players, iA  is the finite set of player i ’s actions (or pure 
strategies), the Cartesian product ii NA A∈=∏ of iA  is the set of situations of the game, and the real 
value function :iP A R→  is the player i ’s utility function, where 1( )i nP a aL is the player i ’s 
utility under the situation 1( )na aL . 
A situation * *1( )na a A∈L is called Nash equilibrium if  
* * * * * * *
1 1 1 1( ) ( )i i n i i i i nP a a a P a a a a a− +≥L L L L  
for any player i  and any action i ia A∈ . A situation * *1( )na a A∈L is called a strict Nash 
equilibrium if  
* * * * * * *
1 1 1 1( ) ( )i i n i i i i nP a a a P a a a a a− +>L L L L  
for any player i  and any action i ia A∈ . 
In this paper, set of all Nash equilibria is denoted by NE .  
Let [ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ be an n-person finite non-cooperative game. Every player i  has exactly 
two actions 1 and 0. When i  uses the action 1, he gets the gross interest ig , and on the other hand, he 
destroys the environment which make each j N∈ of all players get an environmental negative utility 
1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b
je − +
L L , where 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b− +L L  is the corresponding situation. When all players use his 
action 0, none of them can get either gross interest or environmental negative utility.  
Let nB  be the set of binary numbers with the word length n , for example,  
1 {0,1}B = , 2 {00,01,10,11}B = , 3 {000,001,010,011,100,101,110,111}B = . 
We introduce the order relations on nB  as the following:（1） 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b=L p L implies 
that ' 1ib = ⇒ " 1ib = ， 1, 2, ,i n= L  and （ 2 ）  1 1' ' " "n nb b b bL p L implies that 
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1 1' ' " "n nb b b b=L p L and 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b≠L L .  
It is obvious that =p is a partial order relation and p  a quasi order relation. 
Definition 1 An n-person finite non-cooperative game [ ;( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ is called a gross 
interest-environment game, if {1, 2, , }N n= L , {0,1}iA = and 
1
1
1( )
1 0( )
, 1
( )
, 0
n
n
b b
i i i
i n b b
i i
g e b
P b b
e b
⎧ − == ⎨ − =⎩
L
LL ， 1, 2, ,i n= L , 
where 10( ) 0nb bie ≥L and the equal sign is holds if and only if 1 0 0nb b =L L . Where ig  is the 
player i ’gross interest when he uses the action 1, 11( )nb bie
L is the player i ’s negative utility when he uses 
the action 1 under the situation 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b− +L L , and 10( )nb bie L is the player i ’s negative utility 
when he uses the action 1 under the situation 1 1 1( 0 )i i nb b b b− +L L .  
Theorem 1 （monotonicity of environmental negative utility） For a gross interest-environment 
game [ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ , let 1( )nb b A∈L  and 
1
1
1
0( )
( )
1( )
, 0
0
, 1
n
n
n
b b
b b i i
i b b
i i
e b
e
e b
⎧ =< = ⎨ =⎩
L
L
L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . 
Then 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e=L L  if 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b=L L ， 1, 2, ,i n= L , 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e<L L  if 1 1' ' " "n nb b b bL p L ， 1, 2, ,i n= L , and 
1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b b
i ie e≤L L  if 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b=L p L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . 
Proof：We prove only the case 1 ' ' 0 0nb b ≠L L . The case 1 ' ' 0 0nb b =L L is similar. 
（1）Let 1 1' ' " "n nb b b b=L L . We have " 0ib = if ' 0ib = .  So 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ' ') 0( ' '0 ' ') 0( " "0 " ") ( " ")n i i n i i n nb b b b b b b b b b b b
i i i ie e e e− + − += = =L L L L L L . 
Similarly, we have 1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b bi ie e=L L if ' 1ib = .  
（2 ）Let 1 1' ' " "n nb b b bL p L . Let ' 0jb = and " 1jb = for some (1 )j j n≤ ≤ . For any 
(1 , )i i n i j≤ ≤ ≠ , we analysis the three subcases: 
(2.1) " 1ib =  if ' 1ib = . It shows that the player i  is harmed by himself action 1 and the player j ’s 
action 1 under the situation 1( " ")nb bL . However the player i is not harmed by player j ’s action 1 
under the situation 1( ' ')nb bL . Therefore 
1 1 1 1( ' ') 1( ' ') 1( " ") ( " ")n n n nb b b b b b b b
i i i ie e e e= < =L L L L . 
(2.2) Let ' 0ib =  and " 0ib = . Since " 1jb = , we have i j≠ . This shows that the player i  uses 
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the action 0 under the situations 1( " ")nb bL and 1( ' ')nb bL . However he is harmed by the player j ’s 
action 1 under first situation and not under the second one. Therefore 
             1 1 1 1( ' ') 0( ' ') 0( " ") ( " ")n n n nb b b b b b b bi i i ie e e e= < =L L L L . 
(2.3) Let ' 0ib =  and " 1ib = . Similarly, we have 
             1 1 1 1( ' ') 0( ' ') 1( " ") ( " ")n n n nb b b b b b b bi i i ie e e e= < =L L L L . 
To sum up, we obtain 1 1( ' ') ( " ")n nb b b bi ie e<L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . 
(3) It can be immediately obtained from (1) and (2).  
1( )nb b
ie
L is called environmental negative utility. 
 
3.  CONDITIONS FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA 
 
Theorem 2 (0 0)L  is Nash equilibrium in the gross interest-environment game 
[ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡  if and only if 1(0 010 0)i ig e≤ L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . 
Proof: (0 0)L  is Nash equilibrium if and only if  
1(0 010 0)0 (0 0 0) (0 010 0)i i i iP P g e= ≥ = − L LL L L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L  
if and only if 1(0 010 0)i ig e≤ L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . 
Corollary 1 If there exists 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b A− + ∈L L such that 1 1 11( 1 )i i nb b b bi ig e − +> L L , then 
(0 0)L is not Nash equilibrium in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ .  
The corollary shows that if a player’s gross interest is greater than his environmental negative utility 
in some case, then (0 0)L is not stable. 
Proof：Note 1 1 11( 1 ) 1(0 010 0)i i nb b b bi i ig e e− +> ≥L L L L . By theorem 2, the conclusion is obtained.  
Corollary 2 If (0 0)L is Nash equilibrium in the gross interest-environment game 
[ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ , then 1 1 11( 1 )i i nb b b bi ig e − +≤ L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L , for any 1 1 1( 1 )i i nb b b b A− + ∈L L . 
The corollary shows that if (0 0)L is stable, then for every player who uses his action 1, his gross 
interest is not greater than his environmental negative utility. In other words, if there is at least one player 
whose gross interest is greater than environmental negative, then there is at least one player does use his 
action 1. 
Theorem 2’ (0 0)L  is a strict Nash equilibrium in the gross interest-environment game 
[ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡  if and only if 1(0 010 0)i ig e< L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L .     
Theorem 3 (1 1)L is Nash equilibrium in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡  if and only if 
1(1 1) 0(1 0 1)
i i ig e e≥ −L L L , 1,2, ,i n= L . 
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Proof: (1 1)L is Nash equilibrium in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡  if and only if  
1(1 1) 0(1 0 1)(1 1 1) (1 0 1)i i i i ig e P P e− = ≥ = −L L LL L L L ， 1,2, ,i n= L  
if and only if 1(1 1) 0(1 0 1)i i ig e e≥ −L L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L .  
    Similarly, we have 
Theorem 3 ＇ (1 1)L is a strict Nash equilibrium in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡  if and only if 
1(1 1) 0(1 0 1)
i i ig e e> −L L L , 1,2, ,i n= L . 
    By theorems 2 and 3, we obtain immediately that 
Theorem 4 Both (0 0)L and (1 1)L are Nash equilibria in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ if and only if 
1(1 1) 0(1 0 1) 1(0 010 0)
i i i ie e g e− ≤ ≤L L L L L , 1,2, ,i n= L . 
Example 1 Let 1 2 1g g= = ， 1(11)1e = 1(11)2 3e = ， 1(10) 1(01) 0(01) 0(10)1 2 1 2 2e e e e= = = = . Then 
1(11) 1(11) 1(10) 0(10)
1 1 2 2 1 1 2
0(01) 1(01)
1 2 2
1 0
1 ( , ) ( , )
0 ( , ) (0,0)
g e g e g e e
e g e
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
 
1 0
1 ( 2, 2) ( 1, 2)
0 ( 2, 1) (0,0)
= − − − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
. 
Hence both（00）and（11）are Nash equilibria and 
1(11) 0(01) 1(10)
1 1 1 13 2 1 2e e g e− = − = = < = , 1(11) 0(10) 1(01)2 2 2 23 2 1 2e e g e− = − = = < = . 
Theorem 5 If 1(0 010 0) 0(1 101 1)i i ig e e≤ −L L L L , 1,2, ,i n= L , then (0 0)L is a unique strict Nash 
equilibrium in [ ;( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ . 
Proof: Let 
1(0 010 0) 0(1 101 1)
i i ig e e≤ −L L L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . 
Then 1(0 010 0)i ig e< L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . By theorem 2’, (0 0)L is a strict Nash equilibrium. 
For any 1 0 0nb b ≠L L , there exist 01 i n≤ ≤  such that 0 1ib = . If 0ib = , 1, 2, ,i n= L , 
0i i≠ , then 
1 1 10 0
0 0 0 0 0
1( 1 )
1 1 1( 1 )
i i nb b b b
i i i n i iP b b b b g e
− +
− + = − L LL L  
0 0 0 0 0
1(0 010 0)
1 1 10 ( 0 )i i i i i ng e P b b b b− += − < =L L L L . 
Hence 1( )nb bL is not (strict) Nash equilibrium. 
Let 0i i≠  exist and 1ib = . Since 0 01 1 10 1 101 1i i nb b b b− + =L L p L L , by theorem 1, we have 
that  
1 1 10 0
0 0
0( 0 ) 0(1 101 1)i i nb b b b
i ie e
− + ≤L L L L , 1 1 10 0
0 0
0( 0 ) 0(1 101 1)i i nb b b b
i ie e
− + ≤L L L L . 
Therefore 
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0 0 0
1(0 010 0) 0(1 101 1)
i i ig e e≤ −L L L L 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 00 01( 1 ) 0( 0 )i i n i i nb b b b b b b bi ie e− + − +≤ −L L L L . 
Hence 
1 1 10 0
0 0 0 0 0
1( 1 )
1 1 1( 1 )
i i nb b b b
i i i n i iP b b b b g e
− +
− + = − L LL L  
1 1 10 0
0 0 0
0( 0 )
1 1 1( 0 )
i i nb b b b
i i i i ne P b b b b
− =
− +≤ − =L L L L . 
This shows that 1( )nb bL is not strict Nash equilibrium, either.  
Note: Converse of theorem 5 is false.  
Example 2 Let 1 2 1g g= = ， 1(11)1e = 1(11)2 4e = ， 1(10) 1(01) 0(01) 0(10)1 2 1 2 2e e e e= = = = . Then 
1(11) 1(11) 1(10) 0(10)
1 1 2 2 1 1 2
0(01) 1(01)
1 2 2
1 0
1 ( , ) ( , )
0 ( , ) (0,0)
g e g e g e e
e g e
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
 
1 0
1 ( 3, 3) ( 1, 2)
0 ( 2, 1) (0,0)
= − − − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
. 
Although (00)  is a unique strict Nash equilibrium, we have that 
1(10) 0(01)
1 1 11 0 2 2g e e= > = − = − , 1(01) 0(10)2 2 21 0 2 2g e e= > = − = − . 
    Note that 1(0 010 0) 0(1 101 1)i ie e−L L L L 1(1 1) 0(1 101 1)i ie e< −L L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . However we have that 
Theorem 6 If (0 0)L is a unique strict Nash equilibrium in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ , then there exist 
1 i n≤ ≤ such that 1(1 1) 0(1 0 1)i i ig e e≤ −L L L .  
Proof: Let (0 0)L be a unique strict Nash equilibrium in [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ . Then (1 1)L is not. 
By theorem 4’, there exist 1 i n≤ ≤ such that 1(1 1) 0(1 101 1)i i ig e e≤ −L L L . 
Theorem 7 If 1(1 1)i ig e≥ L , 1,2, ,i n= L , then (1 1)L is a unique Nash equilibrium in 
[ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ . 
Proof: By the condition of this theorem, we have that  
1(1 1) 0(1 101 1) 1(1 1)
i i i ie e e g− < ≤L L L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L .  
By theorem 3, (1 1)L is Nash equilibrium in the game. 
Now we prove the uniqueness. For any 1 1 1nb b ≠L L , there exist 0 0,0i i n≤ ≤ such that 
0
0ib = . Then 0 01 1 1 10 1 1n i i nb b b b b b− +=L L L p L . By theorem 1, we have that  
1 1 10 0
0 0
1( 1 ) 1(1 1)i i nb b b b
i ie e
− + <L L L . As a result,  
1 1 10 0
0 0 0 0
0( 0 )
1 1 1( 0 ) 0
i i nb b b b
i i i n iP b b b b e
− +
− + = − <L LL L  
1 1 10 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1( 1 )1(1 1)
1 1 1( 1 )
i i nb b b b
i i i i i i i ng e g e P b b b b
− +
− +≤ − ≤ − =L LL L L . 
This shows that 1( )nb bL is not Nash equilibrium. 
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This theorem shows that every player must use his action 1 if every player’s gross interest is not 
smaller than his environmental negative utility when they so do.  
Note: Converse of theorem 7 is false. 
Example 3 Let 1(11) 1(11)1 2 1 2 2g g e e= = = = ， 1(10) 1(01) 0(01) 0(10)1 2 1 2 1e e e e= = = = . Then 
1(11) 1(11) 1(10) 0(10)
1 1 2 2 1 1 2
0(01) 1(01)
1 2 2
1 0
1 ( , ) ( , )
0 ( , ) (0,0)
g e g e g e e
e g e
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
 
1 0
1 (0,0) (1, 1)
0 ( 1,1) (0,0)
= −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
. 
Although（11）is a unique strict Nash equilibrium, we have that 1(11)1 12g e= = and 1(11)2 22g e= = . 
    Consider that 1(0 010 0) 1(1 1)i ie e<L L L , 1, 2, ,i n= L . We have  
Theorem 8 If 1(0 010 0)i ig e< L L , 1,2, ,i n= L , then (1 1)L is not unique Nash equilibrium in the 
game [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ .  
Proof:  If (1 1)L is a unique Nash equilibrium in the game [ ; ( ); ( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ , then (0 0)L is 
not Nash equilibrium. By theorem 3, there exist 1 i n≤ ≤ such that 1(0 010 0)i ig e≥ L L . 
This theorem tells us that it is difficult for the case that every player uses his action 1 to be formed if 
every player’s gross interest is smaller than his environmental negative utility when only this player uses 
his action 1.  
Theorem 9 If  
1(1 1 10 0)
i m
i ig e≥ LL L , 
0(1 1 0 0 0)1(1 1 0 1 0)
mm j j
j j jg e e≤ −
L L LL L L
, 1, 2, ,i m= L , 1, ,j m n= + L ,  
(1 10 0)
m
L L is Nash equilibrium of the gross interest-environment game [ ; ( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ . 
Proof: Since 
0(1 0 10 0)1(1 1 10 0) 1(1 1 10 0)
mi m i m i
i i i ig e e e≥ > − L L LLL L LL L , 1, 2, ,i m= L , 
0(1 1 0 0 0)1(1 1 0 1 0)
mm j j
j j jg e e≤ −
L L LL L L
, 1, ,j m n= + L , 
we have that 
0(1 101 10 0)
(1 101 10 0) mii imiP e= −
L L LL L L 1(1 111 10 0) (1 111 10 0)i m
i i i i m
g e P< − =L L L L L L ,  
0(1 1 0 0 0)1(1 10 1 0)
(1 10 1 0) (1 10 0 0)mm j j
ji j j im j m j
P g e e P= − ≤ − =L L LL L LL L L L L L ,  
1, 2, ,i m= L , 1, ,j m n= + L . 
Theorem 9＇If 
1(1 1 10 0)
i m
i ig e≥ L L L ,
0(1 10 0 0)1(1 10 1 0)
mm j j
j j jg e e< −
L L LL L L
, 1, 2, ,i m= L , 1, ,j m n= + L , 
(1 10 0)
m
L L is a strict Nash equilibrium of the gross interest-environment game 
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[ ;( );( )]i iN A PΓ ≡ .     
Theorem 10 It is a certain event that (0 0)L is realized if it is Nash equilibrium.  
Proof: Let both (1 10 0)
m
L L and (0 0)L are Nash equilibria. By Corollary of theorem 4, we 
have  
1(1 1 1 0 0)
(1 1 10 0) 0 (0 0 0 0 0)i mi i i ii m i mP g e P= − ≤ =
L L LL L L L L L L , 1, 2, ,i m= L ,  
0(1 10 0 0)
(1 10 0 0) 0 (0 0 0 0 0)m jj i im j m jP e P= − < =
L L L
L L L L L L L , 1, ,j m n= + L .  
Hence (0 0)L  is better than (1 10 0)
m
L L  for every player. Therefore it is a certain event that 
(0 0)L is realized. 
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